Questions to ask your ethics professor

Can ethics be thought of as a science? If not, what about the evolution of ethical systems? Is there anything universal about the idea that where there are enduring cultures there are evolving moral and ethical systems?

Are systems of normative rules such as etiquette, statutory laws, customs, and social traditions part of the evolution of ethical systems? Does etiquette, for example help reduce what are called "exegenous shocks" or rapid responses to stimuli that can set off overreactions that can cause emotions to escalate out of control. For example when you bump into a person you say "excuse me" not only as is customarily required, but also to defuse a hostile situation with someone who is overreactive to people touching them.

Does moral knowledge exist? If there is, does early childhood training, school, clubs and workplace training contribute to moral indoctrination that forms the foundation of moral knowledge?

David Hume claimed that normative statements cannot be derived from empirical facts. But, consider that it is not from facts that normative statements emerge, rather from from human experience, which are in part explained by facts. The focus of Hume's argument is on facts when it should be on experience. In this perspective it is only reasonable that facts do not produce normative values when it is something else that does. The same reasoning applies to G.E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy.

Since Hume's is/ought dichotomy and Moore's naturalistic fallacy are major impediments to asserting any theory which states that morals evolve, it is necessary to constantly point out the illogic of Hume and Moore's beliefs

Simply because formal logic calls itself logical does this necessarily mean it is in fact logical? How can the ethical formalism of the naturalistic fallacy account for the narrowed scope of inquiry excluding facts, experience, history and so forth. Is "logic" logical in this context? Are the problems of the naturalistic fallacy and the is/ought dichotomy real or imagined? Are these problems  real in the same way that lying, cheating and stealing are in a front page newspaper article?

What is the difference between a reasoned argument and a logical one? If logic were used in the strictest sense, wouldn't the volumes of words needed to be logical be so large as to impinge on the understanding the subject under scrutiny?

Can there actually be first principles of ethics (i.e. universal moral principles)? Isn't the contemporary problem of resolving first principles and relativism a problem of defining ethical concepts in static terms when dynamic concepts would function much better? Structural engineering employs dynamic concepts. Static views of complex phenomenon do not work. For instance, the overwhelming complexity of constructing tall buildings require a more dynamic approach employing calculus and differential equations to solve. Can cybernetic science serve as a calculus to solve complex human phenomenon?

Is a paradigm shift in ethics possible? Could this shift be the result of the illogic and inaction of past thinkers who spent too much time basing theory based on words grounded in other words instead of being grounded into a "real time" world of human needs, actions and experiences? 

Linguist S. I. Hayakawa differentiates between arguments of substance and arguments of symbol—"the word is not the thing, the map is not the territory." In this perspective Is the language of the naturalistic fallacy grounded in anything substantial? Here, Moore uses words such as good, goodness, morality and the like  in such a generalized way that it invites the logical conclusion that nothing can be known about these terms. Aren't these words simply symbols that evolve from specific instances of behavior that are known as good or moral? Instances that can be analyzed in a logical and consistent way. The closer a person gets to the source of words. the closer they get to the substance of that word.

Sting theory calls itself science even though it cannot exactly predict the outcome of events in the same way Newtonian physics can. In string theory the arguments and evidence are reasonable, not exact. In the same light, is it possible for there to be reasonable definitions of moral right and wrong, good and bad in the absence of an absolute definition of these terms? Does the ethical formalism of the is/ought dichotomy and the naturalistic fallacy require a level of exactness that cannot be reasonably attained?

v9.7  3/6/05